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Notes
MINERAL RIGHTS-MINERAL RESERVATIONS IN SALES OF
LAND TO THE UNITED STATES

In 1936 the United States purchased a large tract of land from
the Bodcaw Lumber Company for the purpose of establishing
the Kisatchie National Forest. The sale was made subject to a

prior conveyance of the mineral rights in such land to the Good
Pine Oil Corporation. In 1940 the Louisiana Legislature declared
that when the United States acquired land subject to prior sales
of the oil, gas, or other mineral rights, the rights previously sold
or reserved in the sale were to be imprescriptible. 1 After the
normal ten-year prescriptive period had run, the United States

sought a declaratory judgment recognizing it as owner of the
mineral rights. If Act 315 of 1940 were applicable, the title to
these mineral rights had vested in the Nebo Oil Company, the
assignee of Good Pine. The United States District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana held that the act was constitutional and applicable to the facts at hand. 2 The decision was
affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. United States v.
Nebo Oil Corporation,190 F. 2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1950).
The case marks the first instance in which the courts have
passed upon the constitutionality of Act 315.3 The decision affords
an opportunity to examine the act itself, the policy of which
seems to be out of harmony with the previously announced land
1. La. Act 315 of 1940, now La. R.S. 1950, 9:5806. It provides: "When land
is acquired by conventional deed or contract, condemnation or expropriation
proceedings by the United States of America, or any of its subdivisions or
agencies, from any person, firm, or corporation, and by the act of acquisition,
verdict, or judgment, oil, gas, or other minerals or royalties are reserved, or
the land so acquired is by the act of acquisition conveyed subject to a prior
sale or reservation of oil, gas, or other minerals or royalties, still in force and
effect, the rights so reserved or previously sold shall be imprescribable."
This act repealed and superseded Acts 68 and 151 of 1938. See notes 25, 26,
27, infra.
2. United States v. Nebo Oil Co., Inc., 90 F. Supp. 73 (W.D. La. 1950)..
3. The constitutionality of Act 315 was questioned in Whitney National

Bank of New Orleans v. Little Creek Oil Co., 212 La. 949, 33 So. 2d 693 (1947).
However, the principal issue before the Supreme Court involved Nebo's title
to the mineral rights and the constitutional question was successfully evaded.

The court held that the unconstitutionality of the act could be raised only by
an interested party, the United States. Since the United States could not be
made a party to the suit, the court had no jurisdiction to pass on that issue.
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policy of the state.4 This note proposes to consider both the constitutional issues and the statute itself.
I. Constitutionalityof Act 315 of 1940
In the Nebo case it was argued that Act 315, through its
retrospective operation, impaired the obligations of a contract
and divested rights which had vested in the United States. 5 It is
submitted that the court was correct in holding that there was
no violation of the contract clause. The Supreme Court of the
United States has specifically declared that statutes of limitations do not become a part of any contract. In Campbell v. Holt8
the court said: "We certainly do not understand that a right to
defeat a just debt by the statute of limitations is a vested right,
so as to be beyond legislative power in a proper case. The statutes of limitations, as often asserted and especially by this court,
are founded in public needs and policy-are arbitrary enactments
by the law-making power." It is well established that a prescription statute is remedial in nature and can have retrospective
effect.8 In the instant case the government had no vested right
to be protected, only the mere expectancy that the minerals
would revert to the land by prescription.
The government also urged that Act 315 was repugnant to
the clause of the Constitution which empowers Congress to make
necessary rules regarding the territory and other property of the
United States.9 While the jurisprudence on this clause is not well
developed, it seems clear that state action which interferes with
the purposes for which land was acquired by the government is
unconstitutional. The drilling of oil wells on a military reservation or the mining of sulphur in a national park could be such
4. Act 315 makes a permanent separation between the land estate and
the mineral rights. It has been the public policy in Louisiana to keep the
minerals as closely allied to the land estate as possible in order to keep them
in the flow of commerce. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Sailing's Heirs, 150 La.
756, 91 So. 207 (1922).
5. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10.
6. 115 U.S. 620 (1885).
7. Id. at 628.
8. State v. Alden Mills, 202 La. 416, 12 So. 2d 204 (1943); Shreveport Long
Leaf Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 195 La. 812, 197 So. 566 (1940); Dowle v. Becker,
149 La. 160, 88 So. 777 (1921); Barrow v. Wilson, 39 La. Ann. 403, 2 So. 809
(1887); Taglialavore v. Ellerbe, 149 So. 296 (La. App. 1933).
9. U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, provides: "The Congress shall have the
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing
in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the
United States, or of any particular State."
10. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937); Fort Leavenworth
Railroad v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
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In the instant case, however, the lands were pur-

chased under the authority of the Weeks Act, 12 which specifically
condones the reservation of mineral interests in such lands by
the seller. 13 The court was obviously correct in upholding the act
against this line of attack.
It was also contended by the government that Act 315 violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 4
Both federal courts disposed of this argument by holding that
the United States was not a "person" within the terms of the
Fourteenth Amendment. No former case was found in which
this question was decided, but "it has many times been held that
the United States or a state is a 'person' within the meaning of
statutory provisions applying only to persons."'1 5 , (Italics supplied.) Even had the court held that the United States was a
"person" entitled to the protection of the clause, it would have
had to be shown that there was an unreasonable and arbitrary
classification. 16 The-language of Act 315 makes it clear that the
intent of the Legislature was to place the United States in a
different class from other landowners in the State by depriving
7
it of the prescriptive provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code.'
Whether this was unreasonable did not, of course, have to be
decided.
II. A Question of Public Policy
One of the cardinal. principles of Louisiana mineral law is the
"non-ownership" theory of mineral rights. In the main, the nonownership theory is grounded upon the simple civilian concept
that there are but two separate kinds of interests in land11. Note that Act 315 is not limited to land acquired for forest purposes.
See Note 1 supra.
12. 36 Stat. 961 (1911), 16 U.S.C. §§ 480, 500, 513-519, 521, 552, 563 (1911).
13. 16 U.S.C. § 518 (1911).
14. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV: "No State shall deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
15. Helvering, Comm. of Internal Revenue v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank,
293 U.S. 84, 91 (1934). In Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. 229, 231 (1850), the
court remarked that "it would present a strange anomaly, indeed, if, having
the power to make contracts and hold property as other persons, natural
and artificial, [the United States] were not entitled to the same remedies for
their protection."
16. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). Although the principal application of the equal protection clause has been in the field of racial discrimination (see, for example, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 [1886]), the present tendency seems to be to extend its scope to other areas of discrimination.
See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
17. Arts. 789, 3546, La. Civil Code of 1870.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XIII

full ownership and servitudes. 18 One of the best statements of
the Louisiana law on the subject is found in the opinion of the
Louisiana Supreme Court in the celebrated case of Wemple v.
Nabors Oil and Gas Company.19 So firmly fixed is this concept
that only in one other area has there been a successful attempt to
create separate estates in realty, that establishing the separate
20
estate in timber.
Act 315 of 1940 in effect states that .a mineral servitude
reserved by a landowner in a sale of land to the federal government will not be extinguished by ten years non-user, nor shall
it be governed by the other codal provisions -relative to prescription. It has been the policy of our Supreme Court that if an
owner of a servitude fails to take advantage of it and use it for
a period of ten years, the law will consider it abandoned, and the
servitude will be extinguished. 21 This is consistent with the general policy that elements of commerce should not be tied up for
long periods of time. Act 315 creates either a separate mineral
estate or a perpetual servitude. Both are foreign to prior concepts
22
of Louisiana mineral law. ,
Louisiana's prescription laws are the legal expression of
public policy. If the Legislature decides to change the general
land policy of the state, the legality of such legislation cannot be
questioned as long as no state or federal constitutional provision
is infringed. The wisdom of such changes, however, is subject
to inquiry.
The justification for this relaxation of the general policy lies
in the desire to enable the federal government more easily to
acquire land for various governmental projects. 23 Prior to World
18. See Daggett, Mineral Rights, 3-4 (rev. ed. 1949).
19. 154 La. 483, 486, 97 So. 666, 667 (1923). Justice St. Paul, speaking for the
majority, had this to say about a separate mineral estate: "It Is quite certain
that nowhere does our statutory law provide for such an estate; and it is
equally certain that never in our jurisprudence has any such estate been
recognized.... On the contrary, our civil law, coming to us through Roman,
Spanish, and French sources, recognizes but two kinds of estates in lands,
the one corporeal and termed ownership, being the dominion over the soil
and all that lies directly above and below it; and the other incorporeal and
termed servitude being a charge imposed upon land for the utility of other
lands or persons. And accordingly this court has always resisted every
attempt to Introduce into this state any system of land tenures and estates
in land inconsistent with these simple but fundamental principles."
20. La. R.S. 1950, 9:1103.
21. Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 167 La. 847, 120 So. 389
(1929).
22. See Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So.
207 (1922); Rives v. Gulf Refining Co., 133 La. 178, 62 So. 623 (1913).
23. See the discussion in United States v. Nebo Oil Co., Inc., 90 F. Supp.
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War II the federal government bought large tracts of land in
Louisiana as well as in other states. The principal value of much
of this land was in the possibility of mineral production. Understandably, the landowners were unwilling to sell their land
cheaply unless they could reserve the mineral rights for longer
than ten years. Counsel representing the government were then
of the opinion that the Louisiana law of prescription did not
apply to the federal government. 24 Relying on this advice, the
contracting parties made stipulations for mineral reservations of
longer than ten years in many of the sales of land to the United
States. To facilitate these purchases the Louisiana Legislature
passed Acts 6825 and 15128 of 1938, which reflected the position

taken by the federal authorities that the prescription of mineral
servitudes would not operate in favor of the United States. These
acts were repealed and superseded two years later by Act 315
of 1940.27

In 1950 the Legislature passed an act 28 providing a forty year
prescription for non-user of mineral reservations in deeds of land
sold to the state for the establishment of the Anacoco-Prairie
State Game and Fish Reserve.. Again the purpose was undoubtedly to encourage the inexpensive acquisition of land for a public
project. However, the act does seem to relax established principles of public policy.
III. Conclusion
The court probably came to the correct conclusion in holding
73, 90 (W.D. La. 1950). It is doubtful if a less expensive purchase could be
made when, as in the Nebo case, the mineral rights were sold before the sale
of the land to the government.
24. See transcript in Whitney National Bank of New Orleans v. Little
Creek Oil Co., 212 La. 949, 33 So. 2d 693 (1947). The district court in the Nebo
case found that the government did not intend to purchase any mineral
interest whatsoever. 90 F. Supp. 73, 89.
25. La. Act 68 of 1938 makes imprescriptible mineral rights reserved In a
sale of land to the United States, the State of Louisiana or any subdivisions
thereof, when the land is situated within any spillway or floodway.
26. La. Act 151 of 1938 provides that "when real estate is acquired by the
United States of America, the State of Louisiana, or any of its subdivisions,
... for use in any public work, and the act of acquisition contains a reservation of oil, gas, or other minerals or royalties, prescription shall not run
against such reservation."
27. It should be noted that two important changes were made with the
enactment of Act 315. First, the application of Act 315 is limited to sales to
the federal government, whereas Acts 68 and 151 applied to sales made not
only to the federal government but also to the state and all of its political
subdivisions. Second, where the 1938 acts applied only to reservations made
in the conveyance, Act 315 applies as well to reservations by prior conveyances.
28. La. Act 169 of 1950.
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Act 315 of 1940 constitutional. With deference to the wisdom of
the Legislature, it is suggested that there may be well-grounded
fear that the door has been opened for other such relaxations.
If our civilian concepts of non-ownership of mineral rights are
to be retained, then the Legislature should be very hesitant to
adopt such measures as Act 315 of 1940.
A. B. Atkins, Jr.

